

EXHIBIT B

For the District of Delaware

James Hall,

Plaintiff

v.

David Holman, Lawrence
McQuinn and Deputy
Warden Clyde D. Sagers

Defendants,

C.A. # 24-1328-GMS

Jury Trial of Issue
Demanded

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Defendant's David Holman Et Al; in support
of his motion plaintiff offers the following:
Pursuant to Rule 36(A) Fed R. Civ. P. And
Rule 56(C) of the Fed R. Civ. P.

Comes Now, The Plaintiff, James Hall, prose and moves
This Honorable Court to Grant Plaintiff's motion for
Summary Judgment. Because there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of Law
LEGAL STANDARD

1. The Rule states that if a Request for Admission is
not timely answered, The matter is deemed Admitted.
Rule 36(A) Fed R. Civ. P.

Request For Admission, which ask the opposing party to Admit or deny the truth of particular facts, that have been Admitted. A Binding Rule 36(b) Fed.R.Civ.P. [If a party objects to a Request, he must specifically state the reason for the objection. The State Defendants' "non conforming" letter-motion, Dated November 9, 2005 (ID), In Plaintiff's objection he alleges that state defendants failed to support their claim as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(c).

The moving party must confer and make good faith effort to contact Plaintiff and must submit by affidavit with pertinent factual allegations and on the Absent Motion to dismiss. The Request is belied by their shameless delay tactic. [Request for Admission can be served at any time during litigation. The opposing party has (30) days after service to answer or object.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges in his objection [Defendants want to deprive the court in frustrating plaintiff's properly filed and legitimate discovery request. At 42. of Plaintiff's objection he has presented fact that support his position with case law. Demonstrating that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) and it follows the axiom that it is inappropriate to prohibit a legitimate discovery request where-as here the evidence etc. is in possession of Defendant. Plaintiff filed an Affidavit demonstrating this fact. Defendants are seeking protection from discovery and this Honorable Court has not granted Defendant protection from Plaintiff's Discovery Request. Defendant failed to timely respond to Plaintiff's Discovery Request for production of documents, request for admission, request for interrogatories, (ID) certificate of services, moreover plaintiff was allowed 15 day grace period.

Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure. Under that provision summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits...

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); See

Celotex Corp. v. Catlett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 106 S. Ct.

2548, 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986); Security Insurance

Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., when

summary judgment is sought, the moving party bears an initial burden of demonstrating that there is no

genuine dispute of material fact to be decided with

respect to any essential element of the claim in issue;

the failure to meet this burden warrants denial of

the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 4, 106 S. Ct.

At 2511 n. 4; Security Insurance, 391 F.3d at 83. In the

event this initial burden is met, the opposing party

must show, through affidavits or otherwise, that there

is a material issue of fact for trial. [Fn1] Fed R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. At

2553; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. At 2511

[Fn1] "A material fact is genuinely in dispute" if

"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson

, 477 U.S. At 248, 106 S. Ct. At 2510.

Defendants Admit And plaintiff demonstrates that there is no material issue of fact in dispute with regards to The First (1) Essential Element of the plaintiff's Claim.

Substantial Risk of harm:

At Item # 8 of the plaintiff's (Request For Admission) Defendants Admitted that they knew plaintiff faced a substantial Risk of harm (ID. Moreover, they knew plaintiff faced a Substantial Risk of harm and Disregarded that Risk by failing to take reasonable measures so that, it CAISO ID, # 2 # 11

Official knowledge of that risk: Official David Holman Et Al; Admit And plaintiff demonstrates that there is no material issue of fact in dispute with regard to the Second (2) Essential Element of the plaintiff's Claim. It is clearly undisputed that Defendant possessed Actual knowledge of the pervasive Risk of harm to plaintiff (ID. DI. 4. At Item # 26 and Exhibit A, Exhibit B. Memorandum order from Clyde D. Sagers. Dated May 17, 2004.

Officials failure to Respond Reasonable to the Risk: Official David Holman Et Al; Admit and plaintiff demonstrates that there is no material issue of fact in dispute with regards to the third (3) Essential Element of the plaintiff's Claim. Defendants Admitted at Item # 11 (Defendant David Holman, Clyde D. Sagers, Lawrence Nguyen) Defendants intentionally ignored and failed to Respond to a particular known Threat to plaintiff. Thus failing to Respond to Substantial Risk of serious harm, and plaintiff was subjected to unnecessary and To Defendants Deliberate indifference. (ID)

Exhibit (c) David Holman E.A.; Admit and Plaintiff demonstrates that there is no material issue of fact in dispute with regards to the fourth (4) Essential Element of Plaintiff claim.

Causation and injury: Defendants admit at Item # 16 Plaintiff submitted numerous request over a period of 4, 5, months to be moved laterally within the same security level to another cell. Defendant failure to respond reasonable has resulted in permanent injury to Plaintiff. (I)

Physical injury, necessary to support claim against prison official for failure to protect under Requirement of (PLRA): Requires observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by medical care professional; injuries treatable at home and with over-the-counter drugs treating pain, rest and similar methods do not fall within parameters of Requirement 42 U.S.C.A. 1997(e) (ID DI.4 App 3. Appropriate de minimus standard is whether injury is of nature that would require free-world person to visit emergency room or have doctor attend to, give opinion, diagnosis or medical treatment for injury or whether home treatment would suffice Long v. Holt 979 F. Supp. 481 *486.

To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct which does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interest or safety. It's obduracy or wantonness, not indifference or error in good faith, that characterized the conduct prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Whitley v. Albers 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078. At 319.

Defendants admit at #16 of Plaintiff request for admission. The physical pain, mental anguish, fright and shock, embarrassment, humiliation or mortification, psychological injury inflicted upon Plaintiff demonstrates the requisite mental state for a finding of Deliberate indifference.

Defendants' Claim 7 & 8 of their motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff fail to show either Actual Knowledge or a Substantial Risk of Harm. Reason being that Defendant (Stamped Decided) and Admit to actual knowledge David Holman placed his initials By his Name ID) and Defendant Holmans has actual knowledge of The Danger. Defendants Mequins, Sagers ID Decided, XC Deputy Warden 1, Initial; Captain Sagers, Decided Security Defendant have Actual knowledge and also Admit Plaintiff request for Admission ID # 12, Defendant, failed to take reasonable measure to guarantee The safety of inmate, Defendant's conduct or lack of conduct demonstrate a knowing indifference to a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm. Plaintiff # 2, Defendant Clyde Sagers, David Holman, Clarence Mequins knew that plaintiff faced a Substantial Risk of Harm and disregarded that Risk by failing to take reasonable measure to abate it. ID # 8) (of Plaintiff request for Admission). Defendants claim that plaintiff, in his complaint that prison officials, should have known of a Risk at 26), Defend misrepresent the courts ruling (court found that it does not amount to deliberate indifference if an official fails to alleviate a significant threat that he should have identified but failed to find former, 511 U.S. at 837-838, rather the holding is. But an officials failure To alleviate a significant Risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for condemnation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment. the instant case, Plaintiff complained about not being able to protect himself from attack and asking officials to protect him, would suggest, fear, misery and asking for Intervention A.SAP "As soon as possible" ID.

Defendant's Claim in their Motion to Dismiss p. 9

Defendants are Immune in their official capacities

a suit against state official in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the state State v. Mello, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). Qualified Immunity does not protect municipalities or officials sued in their official capacities, Owens v. City of Indianapolis, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980); Moon v. Morgan, 932 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1991); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1990). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring prison officials to use available inmate classification information and procedures to predict compatibility of incoming inmates for double celling because current random assignment of inmates substantially increase risk of violence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ID DJ. 4 and DJ. 2 at #18). Defendants are not entitled to Qualified Immunity in the instant case. However the plaintiff's claim is brought against defendant in their individual capacities the Eighth Amendment does not bar damages suits against them for deprivation of federal rights caused by those officials under color of state law, Scherer v. Rhodes 416, U.S. 232 238 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974), Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-66, 25 S. Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1928) (A nominally-suit against an individual official, however nevertheless may be deemed as one against the state if the state seeks damages from the state treasury see Kui-Lock v. Graham 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 & n.11, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3104-05 & n.11, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985); Brandon v. Ball, 469 U.S. 464 470-71 & n.18, 105 S. Ct. 873, 877 & n.18, 53 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985); Harris v. Crest 755 F.2d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 1985) The Eighth Amendment accordingly provides no shield in this case, Defendant whose relief is sought, David Williams et al., Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants not from the state Treasury.

The relevant Dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted see Wilson v. Greer, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1097, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) As the Supreme Court explained in Anderson the right allegedly violated must be defined at the Appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was (clearly established) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). if the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, Summary Judgment based on Qualified Immunity is Appropriate (see Mullby v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (Qualified Immunity protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. In determining whether jail conditions violate 8 Amendment Court of Appeals need not separately weigh each of the challenged institutional practices and conditions the Court looks instead to the totality of conditions. in light of the news journal's investigation The Department countless Affirmed conditions at the prison where plaintiff James Greer is incarcerated are indeed cruel and unusual (ID Exhibit D.) In Whitely v. Kevorkian, 790 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986) (Assaults among inmates) It's constitutional Standard with preexisting cases make the plaintiff's claim apparent that a inmate is afforded reasonable protection from assault by fellow inmates

"Constitutional Standard"

Alberty v. Kluwenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1986) (Assaults, sexual
 battery inmates), Violence and Sexual Assaults Among Inmates May
 Rise to the level rendering conditions cruel and unusual.

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Citing
Miller v. California, 565 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977), Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d
 1266 (5th Cir. 1977) (not denied Subpoena - McDonald v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950,
 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981). The relevant inquiry "spring[s] from
 constitutional requirements... Rather than a courts idea of how best to
 operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 539, 99 S.Ct.
 1861, 1874, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 469 (1979). The District Court expressly
 recognized its limited role in that situation. 600 F.Supp. at 456-57 These
 limitations do not mean, however, that federal courts must adopt a
 "hands-off" approach to problems of jail administration." Bell, 441 U.S.
 at 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874, 60 L.Ed.2d. at 488. There is no iron
 curtain drawn between the constitution and prisoners of this country." Wolfish v. MacDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41
 L.Ed.2d. 935, 950 (1974). "A prisoner whether already convicted of a crime
 or merely awaiting trial, does not shed all his constitutional rights
 when he puts on jail clothing." Jones, 636 F.2d at 1368. we therefore
 next set out the standard used to draw the line between permissible
 correctional officer unconstitutional conditions and impermissible jail
 administration. The Eighth Amendment imposes the constitutional limitations
 upon punishment: they cannot be "cruel and unusual." This, as a flexible
 standard, no static test can exist by which courts determine whether conditions
 of confinement are cruel and unusual, For the Eighth Amendment, which "must
 draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
 progress of a maturing society" Roth v. Chapman 450 U.S. 337, 346,
 101 S.Ct. 2342, 2349, 69 L.Ed.2d 54, 68 (1984) (Quoting Gregg v. Georgia.

, 356 U.S. 86, 101 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1955) (Plurality opinion). While the Eighth Amendment determination must not be merely a Judge's subjective view, the Constitution contemplates that ultimately a Court over decision/determination will be brought to bear on the question. *Id.* 453 U.S. at 346, 101 S.Ct. At 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 65-69. JAIL conditions must not fall below a minimum standard of decency required by the Eighth Amendment. Conditions which "alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life necessities... could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency... *Id.*

Brief in support of Plaintiff Inmate order

Plaintiff demonstrates that there is no material issue of fact in dispute with regards to the totality of conditions that are dangerous to Plaintiff and future and current DCL population Defendant admit at Plaintiff Request for Admission At Item 26

Defendant David Holman, Etal, admit, many acts of violence at the (MNU) go unreported and undocumented for these reasons:

1) if a Inmate reports violence by another Inmate "Inmates do not want to be labeled snitches" and they often do not report violence

2) if an Inmate reports violence in which he is involved, both he and the other inmate will receive misconduct reports and will be disciplined and transported from (MNU) to (SHU)

(Sequestration of the highest supervision) *Id.*

The plaintiff demonstrates that he and all other inmates at CDCC face a pervasive risk of harm because they belong to a identifiable group singled out by the religious group

1. There is a group that misrepresents as a religious group (i.e., The Muslims). These individuals receive inmates for purposes of [Extortion, Protection, Group Violence, Intimidation]. Inmates not affiliated with this class are referred to as (Confessors, i.e., non-believers). And are singled out for discrimination in an event a (non-believer). Regardless the advancement it is most likely they aggressor will become persistent and promises of protection, acceptance ect. will follow

w. the dual intention's plaintiff. Demonstrates that on 6-6-04 he was subjected to the Group Violence of this classic gang behavior. ID Complaint (D.I. 4 and D.I. 2 H/PB)

The inmate who plaintiff complained to defendants about belongs to this group. The analysis of 6-6-04 suggest that the plaintiff was attacked (twice) on said date receiving a serious injury. The defendants knew that the plaintiff forced a pervasive risk of serious harm & had knowledge of this fact on the part of the defendants is supported by plaintiff's severe efforts to share information of same and asking for help which never came also ID Item # (at D.I. 4 and D.I. 5)

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12-16-05

OK

3) if an Inmate reports a violent incident, but there is neither a "witness" nor physical evidence of an assault (i.e., bleeding, cuts, abrasions) of the reported violence, neither Inmate is disciplined, leaving the victimized inmate labeled as a snitch creating a really substantial risk of further attacks on the victim's safety

27th Jan. The Defendant David Holman et al., knew that the plaintiff faced a pervasive risk of harm

Jan²⁹ The Defendant David Holman et al. Subject. plaintiff To violent assault. and acknowledge. it is not part of the penalty that criminal offend pay for their offenses ignores society plaintiff has demonstrated that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm as noted: plaintiff suffered from a broken right hand and was literally defenseless and Defendants were aware of this fact and yet despite their knowledge they did regard the excessive risk to plaintiff's health and safety thus the plaintiff was suffered the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment Id.

This Deliberate Attitude of Defendant's David Holman et al. clearly demonstrates that there is no material issue in dispute and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.